

Highlights

Optimizing MRAI on Large Scale BGP Networks: An Emulation-Based Approach

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- BGP Convergence is still hampered by problems more than 20 years old, but the difficulty of properly modeling or experimenting with BGP slows down research: this paper shows how the appropriate use of large scale testbeds like Fed4FIRE+ can help overcome the problem.
- Exploiting topological properties of the global organization of the Internet (at the AS/ISP level) such as centrality metrics, this work shows that global Internet convergence can be improved significantly.
- For the first time some possible unstable behaviors of BGP studied in the past with heuristic models has been validated in a real implementation of BGP.
- Internet-like topologies with up to 12000 Autonomous Systems have been emulated on a testbed using BIRD an Open Source BGP implementation.

Optimizing MRAI on Large Scale BGP Networks: An Emulation-Based Approach

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Abstract

Modifying protocols that pertain to global Internet control is extremely challenging, because experimentation is almost impossible and both analytic and simulation models are not detailed and accurate enough to guarantee that changes will not affect negatively the Internet. Federated testbeds like the ones offered by the Fed4FIRE+ project offer a different solution: off-line Internet-scale experiments with thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASes). This work exploits Fed4FIRE+ for a large-scale experimental analysis of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) convergence time under different hypothesis of Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) setting, including an original proposal to improve its management by dynamically setting MRAI based on the topological position of the ASes in relation to the specific route being advertised with the UPDATE messages. MRAI is a timer that regulates the frequency of successive UPDATE messages sent by a BGP router to a specific peer for a given destination. Its large default value significantly slows down convergence after path changes, but its uncoordinated reduction can trigger storms of UPDATE messages and unstable behaviors known as route flapping. The work is based on standard-compliant modifications of the BIRD BGP daemon and shows the tradeoffs between convergence time and signaling overhead with different management techniques.

Keywords: Internet Global Routing, BGP Convergence, Route Flapping, Testbed Experiments, Network Emulation, Topology Generation, MRAI Setting

1. Introduction

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the only protocol available to implement the routing function at the Autonomous System (AS) scale. The border routers of ASes use BGP to export their prefixes and to propagate other prefixes, and its path-vector approach allows the Internet to function in a stable way. While BGP evolved in some of its features, (notably, the security aspects) the way it reaches convergence is essentially the same as in its original design despite its known limitations. The reason for this *ossification* is twofold, the first is that operators are very cautious when considering changes to the component that is critical for the whole Internet, the second is that we cannot experiment at scale

with BGP, and so it is hard to test the effects of new proposals. As a result, BGP evolves slowly.

One explanatory example is the notorious slow convergence of BGP, due to the presence of the Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) timer. When there is a change in the Internet topology, BGP will propagate the information on the new topology using UPDATE messages. Without MRAI this may generate a storm of UPDATE messages in a very short time, each triggering the recomputation of routing tables and ultimately clogging the routers. MRAI prevents this flood by allowing the propagation of only one UPDATE message for every MRAI interval, with the obvious side-effect of slowing down the convergence.

For this reason the value of MRAI has been a

subject of discussion in the literature. As we show in the review of the state of the art (Section 2) its default value was initially set to 30s and then, in absence of an agreement, it was left to the decision of the network operator¹. Finding an optimal value for MRAI would have a huge positive impact on the performance of BGP, however, Fabrikant, Rexford et al. [2] showed that modifying MRAI in an uncoordinated way, can lead in specific cases to the exponential growth of the number of UPDATE messages required to achieve a new stability point after a route change, that is, the opposite of what MRAI should achieve. We detail this problem (Section 3) to show that more than ten years later we are still in this deadlock: we know that MRAI needs to be optimized, but we also know that changing it without coordination may make things worse, and of course, there is no way to coordinate all the network administrators of all ASes to take a certain decision. This example shows the inherent hardness of researching on BGP, it is way too complex to attempt an overall theoretical modeling, simulation approaches are limited because they capture only a part of the complexity of the system, and emulation approaches, so far, could not reach the necessary scale to validate proposals.

Our work has the ambition to show that it is possible to experiment with a real implementation of BGP, namely BGP Internet Routing Daemon (BIRD)², reproducing with a real implementation and measures the results from Fabrikant et al. [2]. We also propose a strategy that allows the improvement of the convergence of BGP without hampering its stability (Section 4), and we evaluate it on emulated networks made of tens of thousands of BGP routers using a fully reproducible approach (Section 5). This paper extends and completes a previous work by the same authors [3] using data we could obtain in the frame of the Fed4FIRE+ project, which supported our work. In short, the three contribution of our paper are the following ones.

Confirm Fabrikant Results. We use our emulation framework to confirm Fabrikant’s results, which is key to understanding the risks associated to dy-

namically setting MRAI. We reproduce and confirm Fabrikant observation in Section 6.1;

Propose and Test a dynamic MRAI configuration strategy. We provide the initial design of a strategy to dynamically set MRAI. We show experimentally that our approach improves the performances of the standard BGP configuration in terms of convergence time, with a limited penalty in the number of generated UPDATE messages (Section 6.2). We achieve such results applying a custom propagation timer that can be computed by each node cooperatively with the others, without requiring global coordination.

Provide a scalable and repeatable BGP experimentation framework. This paper uses an experimental approach that enables the emulation of networks made of tens of thousands of routers, in order to compare different approaches on real code. While in our previous work [3] we already provided all the details to reproduce our results, in this work we increase the size of our emulated network of a factor of 3, and we add the description to the two open source components and one protocol extension we developed to make our experiments possible (Section 7):

- The implementation of MRAI in the open source BIRD daemon, that was missing. The source code is available in the open-sourced project repository and it will be forwarded to the BIRD community for consideration.
- The implementation of an Internet-like topology generator that creates graphs that respect the characteristics of the Internet, including commercial relationships between ASes. Our code is realized in the Python language and has become an integral part of the well known NetworkX Python library.
- Since our proposal includes a modification to the BGP protocol using a custom extension, we also document its design and show that it can be deployed incrementally on the Internet, which is a key requirement for a realistic solution.³

Overall, our work showcases how the availability of a large scale testbed not only leads to viable proposals for long-standing research issues, but it also

¹As a relevant example, Cisco suggests 30s MRAI for any regular Exterior BGP (eBGP) peer [1].

²BIRD is one of the most used and well maintained BGP open source implementations, used in many real world scenarios see <https://bird.nic.cz/en/case-studies/>

³See <https://iof.disi.unitn.it>, and the related github repository <https://github.com/internetonfire>

enables the development of open source code that ultimately benefits the community of the researchers and practitioners.

2. State of the Art

Albeit their extreme importance, global routing and BGP have never been a ‘hot topic’, often perceived more as a management issue relevant only for providers, even if the slow convergence of BGP is a problem that may affect the entire Internet, and consequently the ‘digital life’ of people. Clearly there exist several papers dealing with BGP and its characteristics and features (see [4] and citations therein or [5] to name a few), but the core itself of BGP, i.e., the Path Vector descriptors exchanged by eBGP routers, and the policy-based routing algorithms, do not lend themselves to rigorous theoretical analysis and modeling, thus preventing elegant and sound theoretical results similar to those available for link state and distance vector routing protocols. Indeed, the seminal works by Labovitz et al. at the beginning of this century [6, 7] clearly identified BGP as a major source of Internet failures and disruptions, and also discussed some possible modifications to BGP to improve it. In the following years some works [8, 9] measured and quantified the phenomenon in the Internet, proving that it was real and also potentially very penalizing. After more than 20 years, however, most of the issues are still there.

BGP research has traditionally been based on simulations [10, 11, 12] and/or small-scale testbeds [13, 14], with a few works like the already cited paper by Fabrikant et al. [2], addressing specific issues with a theoretical analysis based on heuristics considerations on BGP dynamics. Other significant works on the subject are based on measures, like the seminal analysis in [15], that clearly identifies the key role of BGP in properties and performance of the global Internet, or [16, 17] analyzing prefix scaling and router ownership boundaries, but they normally document the behavior or the properties and consequences of BGP rather than exploring possible improvements; the PEERING testbed [18] offers an infrastructure to experiment with BGP, but does not seem prone to explore performance or major protocol modifications.

One of the prominent themes in this body of literature is the trade-off between the generated overhead and the convergence speed of BGP after a reconfiguration event. BGP is known to be subject to *path exploration*, a transitory phenomenon that happens

when a router adopts and publishes a sequence of non-optimal paths for a destination before reaching a stable state. Path exploration can generate thousands of update messages in networks made of as few as tens of nodes [19]. In order to reduce the message overhead, BGP uses MRAI, the minimum time between two consecutive UPDATE for the same destination sent to the same neighbor, which is set by default to 30 s [20]. MRAI reduces the overhead but strongly impacts BGP convergence [21] and its default value was often discussed [22].

Difficulties and a negative result, however, cannot be a reason to stop seeking solutions. As noted in [23], which studies the effect of disabling the use of MRAI in part of the ASes of the Internet, in the past 10 years the computing capability of routers increased 8-fold, giving routers the possibility of improve processing, but MRAI default timer has not been changed. The authors of this work notice that it is possible to disable MRAI in nearly 90% of ASes without incurring in instabilities, thus improving the convergence speed of BGP at the cost of additional processing of routing messages (they must be processed faster and in bursts), but without a large increases in the number of messages exchanged. Also this study is based on simulations.

Some older studies like [24, 25] suggested that MRAI could be disabled altogether, but later works have clearly shown that this may lead to instabilities. The authors of [26], for instance, acknowledge that fiddling with MRAI can cause routing message bursts and propose to disperse routing messages in case of bursts to distribute the management load among different routers and ASes. Also [27] propose heuristics to adapt MRAI dynamically and shows via simulations as the previous ones, that convergence can be improved while keeping the number or messages similar to BGP with constant 30 s MRAI.

Several other work including [28, 29, 30] make various proposals to improve BGP performance, reduce convergence times, or reduce route flapping.

Finally, the authors of [31] attempted a general modeling of Path Vector routing protocols analyzing what are the key parameters and the influence of network delays on the convergence speed and properties. This study confirms all the hints and indications of other works.

3. The Problem of MRAI Configuration

MRAI is the key parameter used by BGP to prevent signaling storms when there are changes in the

Symbol	Meaning
\mathcal{V}	set of all the nodes of the BGP graph, i.e., ASes
\mathcal{E}	set of the logical links between BGP nodes
$G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$	BGP network graph
$e_{i,j}$	edge, i.e., logical link between nodes i and j
d, D	destinations (prefixes), set of all destinations
\mathcal{D}	set of ASes that export at least one destination d
d_r	set of ASes that, generating an UPDATE, cause maximal route reconfiguration
\mathcal{N}_i	set of node i neighbors or <i>peers</i>
$\tau(j, d)$	value of MRAI used by a node for destination d and neighbor j
$G_A(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_A})$	the ‘ascending’ portion of $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$
$\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}$	set of nodes in the ‘ascending’ portion of $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$
$\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_A}$	set of edges in the ‘ascending’ portion of $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$
$G_T(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_T})$	the fully connected sub-graph of Tier-1 ASes in $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$
$G_D(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_D}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_D})$	the ‘descending’ portion of $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$
$\Delta(v)$	normalized Destination Partial Centrality (DPC) of node v

Table 1: Main symbols and notation used in the paper.

Internet routing. These storms can be triggered simply because different routers send signaling messages at different times, and this, without proper countermeasures can lead to an exponential growth of messages, specially in case of uncoordinated and non managed signaling generation. For an in-dept description the reader can refer to the work by Fabrikant et al. [2], here we provide only the elementary description to understand the phenomenon.

We model a BGP network as a connected, directed graph $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$; $i \in \mathcal{V}$ are BGP instances (also routers for simplicity – see Table 1 for the notation used in the paper). The edges $e \in \mathcal{E}$ are the BGP relationships between ASes, thus the logical links between BGP instances. An edge $e_{i,j}$ can be, for instance, a peering relation or a customer-provider

one. Regardless the commercial relation, if $e_{i,j}$ exists, then i and j are called *peers* and \mathcal{N}_i is the set of BGP peers of router i .

Routers export network prefixes to other routers with UPDATE messages and cancel them with WITHDRAWAL messages. Prefixes populate the Routing Information Base (RIB) of BGP instances and are properly propagated to all routers in the ASes in order to deliver the packets with a certain destination IP, and this justify the simplification of collapsing an entire AS into a single node i in $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$. As a destination IP address is always mapped onto a prefix, we use the terms prefix and destination interchangeably. Every UPDATE contains information about one or more destinations. Considering a set D that represents the prefixes that can be advertised on the Internet, then the UPDATE describes a route r as the combination of destination and attributes: $r = (\xi, d)$, where the last element of this tuple is a destination network $d \in D$, while ξ represents the attribute list: the path (a sequence of ASes), and a unique ID of the originator router that we skip in our notation for the sake of simplicity.

A router i uses a function $\Gamma(r)$ that outputs a score for the route received by peer j based on a local policy. Given two routes r_1 and r_2 , r_1 is preferable if $\Gamma(r_1) > \Gamma(r_2)$ and r_2 otherwise. When $\Gamma(r_1) = \Gamma(r_2)$ BGP provides a tie-breaking procedure described in [20]. The simplest form of policy, that we use in our emulation, takes into consideration the commercial relationships between i and j and the (possibly weighted) length of the AS path indicated in the attributes ξ .

When a router updates its routing table, it also schedules a new UPDATE message to propagate the information. However, when the Internet topology changes a router will receive UPDATE messages through multiple paths, and may update its routing table several times before it converges to the route r with the highest score. In principle, every modification may generate a new UPDATE possibly containing transient information that will be superseded by the next UPDATE. Such a storm of UPDATE messages may overload the processing capability of the routers.

BGP tackles this problem with the MRAI timer, that limits the rate of outgoing UPDATE messages from a router. MRAI is generally set to 30 seconds (plus a small random value to avoid synchronizations), as described in [20] and can be implemented per peer j or per peer j and per destination d . We consider the second, more fine-grained approach, which is also the suggested solution in [20]: a router

i uses a separate timer for each peer $j \in \mathcal{N}_i$ and for each destination d , initialized to $\tau(j, d)$. Consider the case in which router i receives an UPDATE including a route r for destination d . If the new route changes the routing table of i and triggers the generation of a new UPDATE towards one of its peers j , the UPDATE is sent immediately, and the MRAI timer is started. During this period UPDATE messages from any peer k may change again the routing table of i and may trigger the generation of another UPDATE towards j , however, the updates are not sent. When the MRAI timer fires, if the routing table was affected with respect to the last update sent j , the node advertises the new best option. The routes that have been received but not chosen as the best ones, are kept in a queue and can be used, for example, as backups in case of changes in the network. Since UPDATE messages generally arrive in bursts, MRAI does not affect the generation of the first UPDATE, but slows down the generation of the following ones, avoiding UPDATE flooding and possible route flapping. The larger is MRAI the less is the number of UPDATE generated, but also the slower is the convergence of the entire network.

3.1. Exponential Path Exploration

The management of the MRAI timer does not come without controversies. In 2008, thanks to different studies that take into consideration the dimension of the topology and the latency [32], there has been an Internet Draft proposal to reduce its default value to 5 s [33]. In 2011, a follow-up Internet Draft [22] proposed to let operators choose an arbitrary MRAI value for UPDATE messages, while on the other hand WITHDRAWAL could completely ignore it. None of these Drafts was approved in the end.

The idea that each operator can decide how responsive to changes its system is was appealing, but the study presented by Fabrikant et al. showed also how this can be harmful for the overall network [2]: this study presents a theoretical result where, with particular configurations of MRAI timers and realistic topologies, there is an exponential path exploration behavior. This translates into very long convergence time, but most of all, many messages wasting the computational power of routers with a risk of collapse.

Figure 1 shows an example of such particular graphs. This issue happens when there are multiple paths leading to the destination and a specific sequence of timers $\tau(j, d)$ in the propagation path.




Figure 1: Gadget topology derived from [2] with 3 rings

Let's assume BGP has converged, so that all MRAI timers are off and all the nodes can freely propagate messages. X_0 is the entry point for the destination d that is to be announced through the network. Each node assigns value to a path reading the labels on the edges going from left to right and interpreting them as a binary number. The higher the value of a path, the higher the preference. For example, node X_0 prefers the edge with label 1, and X_3 prefers the path X_3, X_2, X_1, X_0, d over the path $X_3, X_2, Y_2, X_1, X_0, d$ because the first one would be assigned a value of $1111_b = 15_d$, while the second $1101_b = 13_d$. At a certain instant t_0 the node X_0 changes the route towards d selecting the edge with label 0 (for instance because the other edge is broken) and propagates such UPDATE to both X_1 and Y_1 at the same time. At this point in time node X_1 knows the new path through X_0 and the old one passing through Y_1 . This old path is not available anymore, but X_1 is not aware of it, so it decides to reach the destination d using the outdated path through its neighbor Y_1 , as that path has a higher score (10_b) than the newly received one going directly through X_0 (01_b). X_1 will then propagate at time t_1 the change to its neighbors with an UPDATE and initialize two MRAI timers to $\tau(X_2, d)$ and $\tau(Y_2, d)$. Roughly at the same time also Y_1 receives the UPDATE from X_0 , updates its table and distributes its UPDATE to X_1 . This operation introduces a small delay ϵ , so X_1 receives this advertisement at time $t_1 + \epsilon < t_1 + \tau(X_2, d)$ so X_1 cannot further update X_2 because of the MRAI timers was just activated (and the same happens with Y_2).

This behavior makes X_1 send two UPDATE for the same destination d , the first of which was computed on outdated information. Worse than that, the correct UPDATE cannot be propagated to the neighbors before MRAI expires.

The same behavior could happen in the next ring of the chain, but in the case the timers $\tau(X_3, d), \tau(Y_3, d)$ on X_2 are lower than $\tau(X_2, d)$ of X_1 : they will fire before X_1 propagates the correct

update, so X_2 is going to propagate 2 outdated UPDATE messages for every message it receives from X_1 . So the loophole would repeat twice at this level and would exponentially explode further down the chain.

This is a gadget topology identified by Fabrikant et al. to showcase the effect, but the original paper describes other realistic situations in which the presence of multi-paths and a decreasing value of MRAI on the path produces an exponential number of UPDATE messages and route oscillation.

4. Centrality-based MRAI Configuration

A simple solution to this problem would be to always use an increasing MRAI compared to the previous hop. This solution has two drawbacks: first, routers would need to implement some form of dynamic coordination per each propagation path; second, increasing MRAI will slow down convergence.

A better policy would be to have MRAI increase in the initial phase of the propagation, close to the AS k that generate the first UPDATE for route r . Then, when the routers around k stabilize, MRAI should be decreasing in order to quickly propagate the new stable topology to the rest of the Internet. To verify the validity of this intuition we set-up a strategy that exploits the knowledge of the network graph together with the concept of Destination Partial Centrality (DPC).

4.1. DPC - Destination Partial Centrality

DPC is a variant of the so-called load centrality which is defined in its general form as follows [34]. Consider a graph $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ and an algorithm to identify the (potentially multiple) minimum weight path(s) between any pair of vertices (i, j) . Let $\theta_{i,j}$ be a quantity of a generic commodity that is sent from vertex i to vertex j . We assume the commodity is always passed to the next hop following the minimum weight paths, but any routing metric is valid. In case of multiple next hops, the commodity is divided equally among them. We call $\theta_{i,j}(v)$ the amount of commodity forwarded by vertex $v \in \mathcal{V}$ with respect to the vertices i and j . The *load centrality* of v is then given by:

$$LC(v) = \sum_{i,j \in \mathcal{V}} \theta_{i,j}(v) \quad (1)$$

DPC adapts load centrality to represent the propagation of routes in an IP network. In DPC the *commodity* corresponds to the number of networks that a BGP node exports, so only nodes that are directly connected to destinations generate the *commodity*. We call $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ the set of nodes that export at least one prefix, and M_i, M_j the number of networks that are exported by node i and j , respectively, then $\theta_{i,j} = \frac{M_i + M_j}{2}$. Considering a router v , $\theta_{i,j}(v) = \theta_{i,j}$ if v is in the path from i to j or zero otherwise. In all our experiments we assign one destination per node, so that $\theta_{i,j}$ is always unitary but this is an arbitrary choice that can be replaced with any other suitable one. Considering only the case when nodes in \mathcal{D} export only one prefix, the normalized value of DPC of any vertex $v \in \mathcal{V}$ takes the following form:

$$\Delta(v) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}| \times (|\mathcal{D}| - 1)} \sum_{i,j \in \mathcal{D}} \theta_{i,j}(v) \quad (2)$$

DPC does not express load in terms of traffic, but it captures the impact of an AS in terms of routing updates it may generate. If one AS exports many prefixes and it changes its local topology (i.e., adds or removes a peering edge) this information needs to be propagated on the Internet to all routers, regardless of the fact the networks actually generate or receive traffic. DPC also models the fact that some ASes do not export network addresses so they do not generate *load*, but still their centrality can be larger than zero. In a previous work we have shown that load centrality can be computed in a distributed way with minimal modifications to a Distance-Vector routing protocol [35]. Section 7.3 describes how DPC can be computed in a distributed manner with an extension to BGP. Our solution can be incrementally deployed on the Internet without requiring any global coordination. Further theoretical details are outside of the scope of this paper, but principles of centrality-based routing can be found in [35, 36, 37].

4.2. Tuning MRAI with DPC

Our proposal configures MRAI as a function of DPC with the following model. We assume the information contained in the UPDATE message propagates in the network in three phases, which identify three propagation graphs that we formally define in Section 4.3:

- **Ascending phase graph** $G_A(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_A})$;
- **Tier one graph** $G_T(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_T})$;

- **Descending graph phase** $G_D(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_D}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_D})$.

The intuition we follow is that there is an *horizon effect*, meaning that a router j close to the node k that triggers an update has higher chances of modifying its routing choice than a router i that is far away from k . This is intuitive if we look at Fig. 1 in which X_0 has a choice to make between one path and another, but once this choice is made, all the other routers should just keep using the same next hop they used before the change. Moreover, the BGP network is hierarchical, we know that there are ASes of different importance (so-called Tier-1 ASes) that represent a narrow waist of the topology. Once the UPDATE reaches a tier-1 AS it is less likely it will trigger any reconfiguration anymore. However, UPDATE must travel to all BGP routers, because if the path changes, every router needs to update its knowledge of the path.

This intuition is reflected in Eq. (3). Considering a graph-wide maximum timer $T = 30$ s and DPC $\Delta(i) \in [0, 1]$ for node i , DPC-based MRAI $\tau(j, d)$ used by node i with neighbor j for destination d is set as follows:

$$\tau(j, d) = \begin{cases} \frac{T}{2} \Delta(i) & \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A} \\ \frac{T}{2} & \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau} \\ \frac{T \cdot (1 - \Delta(i))}{2} + \frac{T}{2} & \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_D} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

In practice, we increase MRAI in the neighborhood of the node triggering the update to avoid the effect identified by Fabrikant, and we decrease it after we reach Tier-1 AS. Centrality is used to capture the position in the BGP graph that an AS occupies.

In this work we pre-compute the propagation graphs and the DPC in advance, in order to verify that our intuition is correct, however Section 7.3 explains how to design a BGP extension that computes DPC. Together with the theory provided in [35, 36, 37] this paves the way for a distributed and incrementally deployable solution.

4.3. Propagating UPDATE messages on the BGP graph

Following the canonical model used in [38] the links in the BGP graph $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ can be of two kinds, either peer-to-peer or customer-provider depending on commercial agreements. We indicate with $\Lambda = \{\pi, c, s\}$ the labels indicating peer, customer and provider respectively. The function $\lambda : \mathcal{E} \rightarrow \Lambda$

assigns to one endpoint i of edge (i, j) the role i has with respect to j . Hence, $\lambda(i, j) = \pi \iff \lambda(j, i) = \pi$, while $\lambda(i, j) = c \iff \lambda(j, i) = s$.

We call $C_i = \{j \in \mathcal{N}_i : \lambda(i, j) = s\}$ the set of customers of node i and define a tier-one AS as one AS that exports no prefixes, has no providers, and is in a peering relationship with all the other tier-one ASes. We indicate as $G_T(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau})$ the fully connected sub graph of tier-one BGP nodes, such that $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau} \subset \mathcal{V}$, $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau} = \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau} \times \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$. The propagation of a route follows the *no-valley* and *prefer-customer* standard assumption, depicted in Fig. 2 that we reproduce from [38], which means that routes learned from customers are announced to all neighbors, while routes learned from peers or providers are announced only to customers.




Figure 2: Flow chart for UPDATE forwarding.

When a node $i \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$ generates an UPDATE containing a route r , it is propagated to all nodes using the links of $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, with a very specific pattern of route propagation from i to the rest of the network (we assume that the majority of the modifications to the BGP graph come from nodes outside of $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$). We model this pattern by sub-dividing the graph G in three components as the propagation happens in three phases. In the first phase node $i \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$ generates an UPDATE for route r and this propagates toward a node $z \in \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$; we call $G_A(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_A})$ the graph made of all nodes and edges that are involved in this phase. More formally let $i \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$ be the originator of the first UPDATE and $j \in \mathcal{V}$ another node in G . Then $j \in G_A(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_A}) \iff \exists p_{ij}$ a path in G between i and j , with $p_{ij} = (i, k_0) \dots (k_l, j)$ such that:

- $k_x \notin \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_\tau}$, $\forall x = 0, \dots, l$;
- any of the following conditions holds:

1. $\lambda(u, t) = c, \forall (u, t) \in p_{ij};$
2. $\exists z < l : \lambda(u, t) = c, \forall (u, t) \in p_{ik_z}, \lambda(k_z, k_{z+1}) = \pi, \lambda(u, t) = s, \forall (u, t) \in p_{k_{z+1}, j}.$

The first bullet point simply indicates that no nodes in the path are tier-1. In the second bullet point, the first condition describes the case in which the path towards a tier-1 AS is made of only customer-provider relationships, that is, at each hop we encounter a larger ISP (aggregating networks of lower size). The second condition represents a case in which the chain of customer-provider edges is interrupted by a peering edge and followed by a path made of provider-customer edges. Notice that although we define $G_A(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_A})$ with the name *ascending* graph phase, this should not be confused with tier levels. If a route is propagated by a tier-2 AS to its tier-3 customers, if the whole propagation path does not include any tier-1 AS, all such nodes still belong to the ascending graph phase.

The second phase is the one in which the route propagates in $G_T(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_T})$ (the tier-1 network), and the third one is the one in which the route propagates downwards in $G_D(\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_D}, \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{G}_D})$, the graph connecting the nodes in $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T}$ to all the nodes in $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_D} = \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T} \setminus \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}$. More formally $j \in \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_D} \iff \exists p_{ij}$ a path in G between $i \in \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T}$ and j , with $p_{ij} = (i, k_0) \dots (k_l, j)$ such that:

- $j, k_x \notin \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T} \cup \mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_A}, \forall x = 0, \dots, l;$
- $\lambda(u, t) = s, \forall (u, t) \in p_{ij}.$

This simply indicates that the UPDATE propagates along provider-customer relationships.

Note that $\mathcal{V}^{\mathcal{G}_T}$ is fixed and known, and this is realistic assumption considering that tier-1 ASes are a few well known ones. However, the ascending and descending graph depend on the originator node, but a certain node j can ascertain to which graph it belongs just by looking at the AS path specified in the route r .

5. Scenarios

The results we present in Section 6 are obtained in two different scenarios: one for the Fabrikant-gadgets as shown in Fig. 1, and the second one for *Internet-like* topologies that we generate following [38]. Figure 6 shows an example of an Internet-like topology and Section 7.1 describes the generator we implemented.

As suggested by the authors of the original paper, to obtain the route flapping behavior in the chain-gadget topologies we halve the initial value of the MRAI timer at each X_i from left to right (Fig. 1). More formally, the initialization is $\tau(X_{i+1}, d) = \frac{\tau(X_i, d)}{2}$, while the initial timer values used by X_0 is set to 30s, then timers are decremented independently. Each Y_i node uses the same timer of X_{i-1} to propagate routes towards X_i . For these scenario we consider an increasing number of rings, starting from 2, with 5 nodes, up to 8 with 17 nodes, whereas for the Internet-like topologies we consider here topologies with 12 000 ASes; Section 6 presents the results. We use a modified implementation of BIRD on the Fed4FIRE+ testbed to run the experiments; the detailed description of the emulator as well as results on smaller Internet-like topologies were presented in [3].

In the Internet-like scenario we choose the destination d_r whose route changes from the set of nodes that induce the worst case situation, i.e., the change causes a reconfiguration of the largest possible number of nodes. In both topologies, in order to trigger the change in the network we use a well known technique called *AS_PATH Prepending*, whereby an arbitrary number of entries in the AS_PATH list is added forcing the generation of a new BGP UPDATE. For the Fabrikant gadget we repeat each experiment 10 times, while for the Internet-like topologies we repeat 10 experiments choosing different d_r to get more variability. In all cases the initial value of MRAI is subject to a random relative jitter $\rho = 0.05$. Every time the timer is reset, a random value x is drawn from the distribution $U[1.0 - \rho, 1.0]$ and MRAI is set to the default value assigned to the node and route multiplied by x .

To speed up the initial convergence of the network we configure only one destination from any node in \mathcal{D} , consistently with the definition in Eq. (2). In all experiments we start the network emulation, then wait for the routing tables of all nodes to converge, and finally trigger the change in d_r and measure the effects of the change till convergence. For the performance evaluation, we consider convergence time and the number of UPDATE messages generated. We repeat each experiment with the following MRAI strategies:

30s fixed: the default value according to BGP RFC [20];

No MRAI : UPDATE messages are sent immediately without delay, MRAI deactivated.

Fabrikant style: MRAI will be set on each node according to the policies described in Fabrikant work, to reproduce the worst case scenario;

DPC-based: following the centrality computed of-line and the formula in Eq. (3).

6. Numerical Results


6.1. Results on Chain Gadgets

	Strategy	10 th	mean	90 th
updates	30 s	81.6	88.5	95.2
	Fabrikant	157.1	201.3	220.8
	No MRAI	131.3	133.0	138.1
	DPC	63.0	64.2	66.0
conv. [s]	30 s	146.58	156.40	177.22
	Fabrikant	18.14	22.98	25.35
	No MRAI	0.19	0.20	0.21
	DPC	15.60	16.83	18.60


Table 2: Statistics on the number of updates and the convergence time for the experiments with a 17 node chain like the one in Fig. 1.

Table 2 and Fig. 3 report the results for a chain topology (Fig. 1) with 17 nodes. Table 2 presents the aggregate results for an easy comparison. It is clear that the standard 30s MRAI requires a very long time (more than 150s on average) to converge sending between 80 and 95 UPDATE messages. Fabrikant MRAI settings confirm that the predicted explosion of UPDATE messages happens also with a real implementation of the protocol. Simply removing MRAI leads to very fast convergence, but doubles (in this simple case) the number of UPDATE messages sent, hinting that in larger topologies the number of UPDATE may clog the system. DPC, the method proposed in this paper, achieves a convergence time roughly 10 times faster than the standard 30s setting sending the minimum amount of UPDATE among the tested solutions. Interestingly, also the variability of sent UPDATE is minimal, indicating a very stable behavior.


Figure 3 presents the detailed behavior during the route change episode. Each line reports the average of 10 curves (one per run) measured starting from the time when d_r triggers a reconfiguration. The time axis spans the entire time needed to reach stability in steps of 1 s, reduced to 1 ms for No MRAI




(a) 30s MRAI strategy



(b) Fabrikant MRAI strategy




(c) No MRAI strategy




(d) DPC-based MRAI strategy

Figure 3: Time evolution of MRAI strategies on 17 nodes chain like the one in Fig. 1.

because it converges in less than 1 s. The four strategies have a very different behavior. The 30s MRAI strategy creates bursts of UPDATE which make nodes converge gradually. The Fabrikant configuration has a long phase in which all the nodes (excluding one-hop neighbors) do not have a valid path. The No MRAI strategy behaves as expected, convergence is almost immediate but path exploration generates more 130 UPDATE messages concentrated in less than 250 ms even if the number of nodes is just 17. The DPC-based strategy does not have a clear pattern of UPDATE generation as its MRAI is different in different nodes, but offers a clear improvement over the previous strategies.



(a) Number of messages required to reach convergence



(b) Time in second required to reach convergence

Figure 4: Convergence time and UPDATE messages with chains of growing length.

Figure 4 presents the trend of the number of UPDATE sent and the convergence time as the number of nodes in the Fabrikant-gadget network (Fig. 1) grows. Figure 4a reports the average number of UPDATE messages on chains of growing length and the exponential growth of the number of UPDATE messages in the Fabrikant configuration is clearly visible. Also No MRAI and 30s have a super-linear growth, while DPC has a linear growth. Figure 4b reports the convergence time: DPC substantially improves Fabrikant configuration and outperforms the 30s strategy. No MRAI always converges in less than a second, and thus is not reported.

Note that since Fabrikant configuration halves the MRAI at every hop we could not test chains longer than 17 nodes as the MRAI value would be negligible, and the behavior would probably converge to the No MRAI one. Nevertheless we can confirm that:


- Fabrikant configuration is systematically outperformed by any other strategy, thus we verified its abnormal trend;
- The No MRAI strategy produces the fastest convergence but the time-density of UPDATE messages is not sustainable since it produces tens of reconfiguration per node in a few hundreds of milliseconds. While this can be handled in a small gadget, the computational overhead needed to update routing tables made of tens of thousands of destinations would not be acceptable;
- The 30s strategy prevents path exploration, but strongly impacts convergence time; and,
- DPC-based configuration seems to provide the best trade-off between convergence speed and number of UPDATE messages.

6.2. Internet-like Topologies and Scaling


	Strategy	10 th	mean	90 th
updates	30 s	106 946	136 563	162 169
	DPC	158 237	189 850	210 452
conv. [s]	30 s	205.9	220.5	235.1
	DPC	88.0	89.0	118.1

Table 3: Statistics on the number of updates and the convergence time (in [s]) for an Internet-like topology with 12 000 nodes.

Once verified that in the critical topologies designed by Fabrikant DPC-based MRAI proves to be a viable solution, we report the results obtained on a 12 000 node Internet-like topology, the largest we could emulate on Fed4FIRE+. We compare only the DPC-based and 30s MRAI strategies since Fabrikant configuration is not applicable to a generic topology, and No MRAI is unfeasible with thousands



(a) Evolution in time of the 30s fixed MRAI strategy



(b) Evolution in time of the DPC MRAI strategy

Figure 5: Evolution in time of the two main MRAI strategies on the same Elmokashfi topology of 12000 nodes, average of 10 repetitions for each strategy.

of nodes. Table 3 reports the main statistics and shows that DPC produces in average more UPDATE messages but converges in just 40% of time needed by the 30s strategy.

Figure 5 reports the time evolution of all the experiments for additional insight. The first one is that the number of UPDATE bursts (the blue curve spikes in the figure) is reduced with DPC-based MRAI. This means that the increase in the total number of messages reported in Table 3 is compensated by a smaller number or “rounds” necessary to make BGP converge. DPC-based centrality does not only reduces the interval between bursts, it eventually makes each round or UPDATE exchanges more effective as convergence is faster. The second insight is that with DPC-based MRAI some rounds of UPDATE exchanges have a greater effect than others on the number of nodes that reach convergence; it is an interesting phenomenon that needs further study, as it suggests that there are some nodes that are more important than others, and should converge as early as possible. With centrality-based MRAI tuning we

would like to help the convergence of those nodes, and then quickly propagate “good” information to the rest of the network.

7. Open Source Code and Specifications

Emulating BGP involves a number of complex steps that are needed to recreate realistic conditions. These steps require the realization of code and specifications (open source) that are an integral part of the contribution of this paper. This section documents our implementation of a realistic BGP topology generator, the implementation of per neighbor and destination MRAI in the open source BGP daemon BIRD, and the design of a BGP extension to support the distributed computation and propagation of DPC. The software is publicly available both through GitHub⁴ and Zenodo⁵.

7.1. BGP topology

We implement the model provided by Elmokashfi et al. [38], that generates graphs preserving the structure of the Internet from a stochastic perspective. Graph nodes represent BGP routers (one per AS) that can be of four kinds (i.e., Tier-1, Mid-level, Customer, and Content Provider: {T, M, C, CP}). Their number, interconnection and peering agreement is generated based on the analysis of the Internet topology. Figure 6 reports a generated network with 1000 nodes.

The graph generator is implemented in Python and is now integral part of the well known NetworkX python package, one of the most supported and used libraries for network science⁶. Figure 7 shows the graph generator resource footprint in terms of time and memory needed on both a normal customer laptop and a server, respectively in purple and green, for increasing number of nodes. The first one uses an Intel I7 7500u cpu (2.7 - 3.5 GHz) and 16GB of memory, while the second has an Intel Xeon Silver (2.3 GHz) with 503 GB of memory available. Overall the normal laptop requires double the time and resources when generating bigger graphs, but it is still possible to execute it in a reasonable time and space.

⁴<https://github.com/internetonfire>

⁵<https://zenodo.org/doi/10.5281/zenodo.10721373>

⁶https://networkx.org/documentation/stable/reference/generated/networkx.generators.internet_as_graphs.random_internet_as_graph.html

The topology information is stored in a GraphML file, a standard format to represent graphs, the nodes attributes are (we refer the reader to [38] for details and terminology):

- type {T, M, C, CP}: defines the type of AS;
- destinations: a string of comma separated IPv4 network identifiers (prefixes) with the respective netmask, indicating the list of networks the AS exposes.

Given $i, j \in \mathcal{V}$, the attributes for an edge $(i, j) \in \mathcal{E}$ are:

- type {transit, peer}: indicates whether there is a customer-provider (i.e., i pays j for transit or vice versa) or a peering relationship (i.e., i and j agreed to exchange traffic under certain conditions for free);
- customer $z \in V$: if the edge (i, j) is of type transit, z identifies which node between i and j is the customer. For peer edges, this attribute is set to “none”.

We also realized a generator of the so-called “chain gadget” described in the work of Fabrikant et al. [2] that we used to validate the problem identified there.

7.2. Implementing MRAI on BIRD

As mentioned in Section 1 BIRD does not implement the functionalities necessary to execute experiments with BGP timers: indeed, there is no notion of MRAI inside the daemon and therefore all the UPDATE where distributed immediately. We implemented the MRAI timer following both the BIRD guidelines but also the specifics of the original BGP RFC [20], i.e., the initial value of the timer and the usage of a jitter. BIRD provides the possibility to initialize the nodes through configuration files, so we included new parameters to tune the new functionalities for each BGP session:

- `mrai_time`, which can be used to configure the MRAI value in milliseconds;
- `mrai_type`, flag used to distinguish between a peer-based MRAI timer or, by default, peer and destination-based timer;
- `mrai_jitter`, jitter value used to randomize the MRAI value at every iteration.




Figure 6: Elmokashfi (Internet-like) topology with 1000 nodes, derived from [38], where Tier-1, Mid-level, Customer, and Content-Provider nodes are represented in orange, green, purple, and cyan, respectively.




Figure 7: Time and memory used by our Python implementation versus the number of AS nodes. Results show the average (the dot), maximum (upper whisker), and minimum (lower whisker) across 10 independent runs on an Intel I7 7500u (2.7 - 3.5 GHz) in purple and across 50 independent runs on an Intel Xeon Silver cpu (2.3 GHz) with 503 GB of memory in green.

As the original RFC [20] describes, MRAI is a timer defined at the BGP-session level, but affects separately each destination forwarded in that session. We anyhow provide the possibility to apply a single timer to all the destinations that should be distributed towards that neighbor, by setting

`mrai_type` equal to 0. We test one destination per run so the value of this flag does not affect our experiments.

We implemented the timer through the introduction of a specific function and the manipulation of the outgoing queues. Following the RFC [20], the timer should not delay the evaluation of new routes in the `Adj-RIBs-In` but only the process that takes the best route from the `Adj-RIBs-In` and places it in the “active” table `LOC-RIB` and further propagate the node decision to the `Adj-RIBs-Out` queues. The procedure is executed after the `Adj-RIBs-in` evaluation and there can be two possible situations:

- **MRAI not active:** the `UPDATE` in the `Adj-RIB-Out` can be propagated and, after that, the timer will be started according to the configured value;
- **MRAI active:** it is not possible to propagate the new information, so the evaluation of the best route will be executed once the timer expires.

The second phase is where MRAI actually affects BGP behavior, stopping potentially flapping routes from propagating further and avoiding their distribution. Once the routing table has been updated it is mandatory to also compute the outgoing queue `Adj-RIBs-Out`, substituting the path in the `UPDATE` message if a new route becomes the preferred one or even not doing anything if there has been an oscillation, i.e., a `WITHDRAWAL` whose effect is cancelled by an `UPDATE`. In the first scenario, after the distribution of the message the timer will become active, with a value defined by the combination of `mrai_time` and `mrai_jitter`. Once this timer expires the function `dest_mrai_timeout` is triggered in order to resume the route comparison process.

7.3. The DPC BGP Extension

Here we describe the extension to the BGP protocol to support a distributed computation of the DPC metric. This proposal requires the introduction of two new parameters that extend the *Path attributes* in the `UPDATE` message, presented in Table 4. These attributes should be flagged as *optional-transitive*, as defined in [20], to ensure that legacy nodes can ignore but still forward them.

The first attribute, `NH`, is used to identify the list of Next Hops (NHs) that the node can use to propagate the route d contained in the `UPDATE` message. It is not possible to assume there is only one NH due

Attr. Name	Attribute fields	
	[2 Byte]	[Variable size]
<code>NH</code>	<code>nNH</code>	<code>NH_AS</code>
<code>ASLoad</code>	<code>nASL</code>	<code>ASL_List</code>

Table 4: Description of BGP parameters for distributed computation of the DPC metric

to the multi-path peculiarities of BGP and the capability of the ASes to share aggregated paths. The first element `nNH` encodes the number of elements in the list, and it is a 16 bit object. The second element is a the actual list of ASes identifiers. Each AS identifier is 32 bit in size, for a total of size of $nNH \times 32$ bit.

The second object identifies the current load (the commodity we use to compute DPC of known ASes. This is necessary for the receiving AS i to compute its own load and DPC, summing the load provided as input from the other ASes. As the previous attribute the first item is a 16 bit counter that identifies the number of ASes in the list `ASL_List`. Each object in the list is a tuple (θ, AS_{id}, t) that describes the current load θ associated with AS identifier AS_{id} and a value to describe when the load has been propagated t . This is necessary to identify outdated values that are circulating in the network. The load θ should be encoded with 32 bit and the same dimension applies to AS_{id} , while t can be store as *UNIX time* in milliseconds, following the standard dimension of 64 bit. In total `AS_List` has a size equal to $ASLoad \times 128$ bit.

A BGP node should keep a dictionary with the last load values associated with each other AS that shares its metric. In case of changes to its content, the new values should be included in the next `UPDATE` message sent to the neighbors. Each node is responsible to update its own load value once the input ASes metrics changes and then redistribute the changes.

To let a generic node i compute its input load, it has to know if neighbor j has chosen it to forward traffic to d . To achieve this goal we envision three possible methods:

Periodic Route-Refresh: Node i periodically asks node j for its current configuration of best paths. This kind of messages, defined in [39] is usually done only when there has been a change in the policy and a re-evaluation is required, but

in this case can be exploited to acquire more knowledge of the decision process of other nodes. This option is fully backward-compatible and incrementally deployable;

UPDATE back-propagation: Once node j has decided to use node i as best neighbor to reach d , it includes i into the set of nodes that, according to the policies, should be updated. The message is going to be dumped by i because of the loop-detection mechanism, but the mechanism can still trigger an update of the centrality depending on the attributes in the UPDATE;

Traffic analysis: This method requires the cooperation of the BGP daemon and a traffic analyzer. Once the analyzer detects that the neighbor j is forwarding traffic towards i for the destination d it's safe to assume that j has chosen i as best neighbor and therefore communicate it to the BGP daemon towards a new internal API.

These modifications to BGP will let the network self-compute the load value depending on the number of routes given as input and outputs while still providing enough flexibility for ASes to obfuscate the path through aggregation.

8. Conclusions

Conducting Internet-scale research is extremely challenging for many reasons. One of them is the performance evaluation of the proposals: It cannot be tackled with analytic models because they lack the required detail level, it cannot be easily conducted with (realistic) simulations because of computing resources limitation as well as the lack (again) of realistic models, and it cannot be carried out with simple lab experiments because they lack the scale of the Internet. The use of large-scale testbeds where the proposed solutions are implemented in the real protocols under study is thus a nearly mandatory tool to make this kind of research credible.

We have explored in this work the use of the federation of testbeds provided by Fed4FIRE+ to evaluate changes in the management of the MRAI timer of BGP using the BIRD open source implementation properly modified with our proposal and other techniques proposed in the literature. The experimental work has been carefully crafted to make results easily reproducible (given all the software we

developed and the scripts we have devised are public and Open Source), offering the community not only a detailed description of all the experimental machinery we have developed, but also the code developed, the scripts to run the experiments and the post-processing tools to obtain results and graphs.

An experimental setup that can be used to carry out research on BGP to help improve the overall performance of Internet global routing has an intrinsic value; furthermore our contribution also shows that it is indeed possible to improve Internet convergence after a route change by properly managing MRAI, and this without the risk of signaling overhead explosion. We have run experiments with simple topologies to show that analytic results presented in the past with simplified models really show up also in real experiments running actual protocols. Next, we have clearly explained the theoretical foundations of our proposal, and validated the results with experiments emulating networks with up to 12 000 ASes, showing that it is possible to modify BGP to improve Internet routing convergence time after changes in topology, a fairly frequent event with the growing number of ASes and prefix destinations.

Acknowledgements

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