Tag Archives: Security and Privacy

30/11/2016 – Talk by Moreno Ambrosin (University of Padova)

Title: Secure and Scalable Services for the Internet of Things, and Past and Ongoing Effort in the Security of Software-Defined Networking
Time: 13:00
Location: Meeting room, Building Zeta
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Moreno Ambrosin
Abstract:
In recent years, the advent of Internet of Things (IoT) is populating the world with billions of low cost heterogeneous interconnected devices. IoT devices are quickly penetrating in many aspects of our daily lives, and enabling new innovative services, ranging from fitness tracking, to factory automation. Unfortunately, their wide use, as well as their low-cost nature, make IoT devices also an attractive target for attackers, which may exploit them to perform DoS attacks, or violate the privacy of end users. Furthermore, the potentially very large scale of IoT systems makes the use of existing security solutions unfeasible.
In this talk I will give an overview of our research effort in defining secure and scalable protocols and mechanisms for IoT services, and in particular for: (1) efficient and secure device management at large scale (commands and software distribution, and device sanity check); and (2) privacy-preservation in three representative IoT-enabled services and tasks: location-based services, advanced metering infrastructures, and decentralized consensus in a multi-agent systems. Finally, in the last part of this talk I will briefly introduce past, and ongoing research work of our group in Software-Defined Networking security.

28/10/2016 – Talk by Matteo Maffei

Title: Security and Privacy for Cloud Storage
Time: 13:00
Location: Meeting room
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Matteo Maffei (Saarland University)
Abstract: Cloud storage has rapidly become a cornerstone of many IT infrastructures, constituting a seamless solution for the backup, synchronization, and sharing of large amounts of data. Putting user data in the direct control of cloud service providers, however, raises security and privacy concerns related to the integrity of outsourced data, the accidental or intentional leakage of sensitive information, the profiling of user activities and so on. Furthermore, even if the cloud provider is trusted, users having access to outsourced files might be malicious and misbehave. These concerns are particularly serious in sensitive applications like personal health records and credit score systems.
To tackle this problem, we present GORAM, a cryptographic system that protects the secrecy and integrity of outsourced data with respect to both an untrusted server and malicious clients, guarantees the anonymity and unlinkability of accesses to such data, and allows the data owner to share outsourced data with other clients, selectively granting them read and write permissions. GORAM is the first system to achieve such a wide range of security and privacy properties for outsourced storage. In the process of designing an efficient construction, we developed two new, generally applicable cryptographic schemes, namely, batched zero-knowledge proofs of shuffle and an accountability technique based on chameleon signatures, which we consider of independent interest. We implemented GORAM in Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and ran a performance evaluation demonstrating the scalability and efficiency of our construction.

27/07/2016 – Talk by Marco Squarcina

Title:  Relation on ongoing PhD program
Time: 14:00
Location: Acadia Lab
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Marco Squarcina
Abstract:

The aim of this talk is to briefly report on my ongoing research activities. After presenting the accepted and in-progress papers, I will focus on the results achieved during the internship at Cryptosense in Paris where I carried out the analysis of several Java keystores (storage facilities for cryptographic keys and certificates) exposing
design and implementation weaknesses. I am currently investigating on the cracking-resistance of the keystores against brute force attacks and I plan to support my findings by implementing password cracking plugins for popular tools such as jtr or hashcat.

04/11/2015 – Talk by Enrico Steffinlongo

Title:  Static Detection of Collusion Attacks in ARBAC-based Workflow Systems
Time: 13:00
Location: Meeting Room, building Zeta
Type: Research result
Speaker: Enrico Steffinlongo
Abstract: Authorization in workflow systems is usually built on top of role-based access control (RBAC); security policies on workflows are then expressed as constraints on the users performing a set of tasks and the roles assigned to them. When the user-to-role assignment can be changed by potentially untrusted users, like in the case of Administrative RBAC (ARBAC), collusions may take place to circumvent the intended security policies. In this paper, we study this problem in a formal model of workflows based on event structures and we define a precise notion of security against collusion. We then propose a static analysis technique based on a reduction to a role reachability problem for ARBAC, which can be used to prove or disprove security for restricted – yet useful – classes of workflow systems. Finally, we implement our analysis in a tool, WARBAC, and we experimentally show its effectiveness on a set of publicly available examples.

01/04/2014 – Talk by M. Squarcina and M. Tempesta

Title: Surviving the Web: A Journey into Web Session Security
Time: 14:00
Location: Meeting Room, building Zeta
Type: Survey of literature
Speaker: Marco Squarcina and Mauro Tempesta
Abstract: In this talk we describe and classify web security properties, attacks and security solutions. We focus on client-side attacks against web sessions, i.e., attacks that target honest user clients establishing a session with a remote web server. We identify general security properties representative of web session security and we highlight the properties violated by the different attacks. We then survey existing security solutions and mechanisms that prevent or mitigate the attacks: for each security solution, we also evaluate the impact on usability, the compatibility with existing web sites and the ease of deployment. Finally, we identify a list of sound principles that, to some extents, have been taken into account by the designers of the surveyed solutions. We believe that these principles could be helpful for the development of innovative solutions approaching web security in a more systematic and comprehensive way.

04/02/2015 – Talk by Wilayat Khan

Title: Web Session Security: Formal Verification, Client-Side Enforcement and Experimental Analysis
Time: 13:00
Location: Meeting room
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Wilayat Khan
Abstract:

Web applications are the dominant means to provide access to millions of on-line  services and applications such as banking and e-commerce. To personalize users’  web experience, servers need to authenticate the users and then maintain their authentication state throughout a set of related HTTP requests and responses called a web session. As HTTP is a stateless protocol, the common approach, used by most of the web applications to maintain web session, is to use HTTP cookies. Each request belonging to a web session is authenticated by having the web browser to provide to the server a unique long random string, known as session identifier stored as cookie called session cookie. Taking over the session identifier gives full control over to the attacker and hence is an attractive target of the attacker to attack on the confidentiality and integrity of web sessions. The browser should take care of the web session security: a session cookie belonging to one source should not be corrupted or stolen or forced, to be sent with the requests, by any other source.

This research demonstrates that security policies can in fact be written down for both, confidentiality and integrity, of web sessions and enforced at the client side without getting any support from the servers and without breaking too many web applications. Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms designed can be proved correct within mathematical models of the web browsers. These claims are supported by

1) defining both, end-to-end and access control, security policies to protect web sessions;

2) introducing a new and using exiting mathematical models of the web browser extended with confidentiality and integrity security policies for web sessions;

3) offering mathematical proofs that the security mechanisms do enforce the security policies; and

4) designing and developing  prototype browser extensions to test that real-life web applications are supported.

19/03/2014 – Talk by Andriana E. Gkaniatsou

Title:  Towards the automated analysis of low-level cryptographic protocols
Time: 13:00
Location: Meeting room
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Andriana E. Gkaniatsou (U. of Edinburgh)
Abstract:
In this talk we discuss the problem of the automated analysis of reversed engineered low-level cryptographic protocols. Such analysis is difficult, as most of such protocol implementations are proprietary and confidential.
Our proposal is to consider the analysis as an inference problem and use knowledge repair techniques to fix possible mismatches. We discuss our thoughts towards this problem, and some working examples based on real card implementations.

24/01/2014 – Talk by Mauro Conti

Title:  Future Internet Security and Privacy (challenges)
Time: 14:00
Location: Meeting room
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Mauro conti
Abstract:

The Internet is an amazing success story, connecting hundreds of millions of users. However, in the last decade, there has been a growing realization that the current Internet Protocol is reaching the limits of its senescence. In fact, the way people access and utilize it has changed radically since the 1970-s when its architecture was conceived.
This has prompted several research efforts that aim to design potential next-generation Internet architectures. In particular, Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an emerging networking paradigm being considered as a possible replacement for the current IP-based host-centric Internet infrastructure. CCN focuses on content distribution, which is arguably not well served by IP. Named-Data Networking (NDN) is an example of CCN.
NDN is also an active research project under the NSF Future Internet Architectures (FIA) program. FIA emphasizes security and privacy from the outset and by design. To be a viable Internet architecture, NDN must be resilient against current and emerging threats.

In this talk, we highlight the main security and privacy issues we identified in NDN. Then, as a representative case, we discuss interest flooding, a possible denial-of-service attack that exploits key architectural features of NDN. We show that an adversary with limited resources can implement such attack, having a significant impact on network performance. We then introduce Poseidon: a framework for detecting and mitigating interest flooding attacks. Finally, we report on results of extensive simulations assessing proposed countermeasure.

20/11/2013 – Talk by Wilayat Khan

Title:  Automatic and Robust Client-Side Protection for Cookie-Based Sessions
Time: 11:00
Location: Meeting room
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Wilayat Khan
Abstract:
Abstract: Session cookies constitute one of the primary attack targets
against client authentication on the Web, hence modern web browsers
implement native protection mechanisms for them based on the Secure
and HttpOnly flags. While there is a general understanding about the
effectiveness of these defences, no formal result has so far proved about
the security guarantees they convey.

In this work, we have provided the first such result, with a mechanized
proof of non-interference assessing the robustness of the Secure and
HttpOnly cookie flags against both web and network attacks. We have
mechanized the proofs using the interactive theorem prover Coq.
Furthermore, we have developed CookiExt, a browser extension
that provides client-side protection against session hijacking based on
appropriate flagging of session cookies and automatic redirection over
HTTPS for HTTP requests carrying such cookies. Our solution improves
over existing client-side defences by combining protection against both
web and network attacks, while at the same time being designed so as
to minimise its effects on the user’s browsing experience.

22.03.2013 – Talk by Pedro Adão

Title: Computationally Sound Verification of the NSL Protocol via Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker
Time: 13:00
Location: Meeting room
Type: Research Result
Speaker: Pedro Adão
Abstract:

We show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers  proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh for computationally sound verification of security protocols is powerful enough to verify actual protocols.  In their work,  Bana and Comon-Lundh presented only the general framework, but they did not introduce sufficiently many axioms to actually prove protocols.We present a  set of  axioms—some generic axioms that are computationally sound for all PPT  algorithms, and two specific axioms that are sound for CCA2 secure encryptions—and illustrate the power of this technique by giving the first computationally sound  verification (secrecy and authentication) via symbolic attackers of the  NSL Protocol  that does not need any further restrictive assumptions about the  computational implementation. These axioms are entirely modular, and not particular to the NSL protocol hence can be reused in the proofs of security for many other security protocols.Joint work with Gergei Bana and Hideki Sakurada